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Reforming the Requirements for Due
Execution of Wills: Some Guidance from the
Past
Lloyd Bonfield*
The recent revision of the Uniform Probate Code (1990) accepted the "dispensing
power" with respectto will execution, revocation,revival, and alteration. Undersection 2-503,
a will that has not been executed in conformity with the formalities of will execution should
nevertheless be admitted to probate ifthe probate court finds "by clear and convincing
evidence" that the decedent intended the document to stand as a will This Article reviews the
literature supporting the change in wills acts and examines cases that have considered
applying remedies for defectively executed wills. It is argued by the proponents of the
dispensingpower that the doctrines of undue influence andfraud will afford the protection that
will executionformalitiesare supposedto serve. By surveying modem cases of undue influence
as well as late seventeenth century will contests in England, this Article questions whether
"undue influence" can supporta greaterburden.
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JNTRODUCTION

Among the well-worn adages foisted upon history
undergraduates as justification for their toils in the musty past, none
ranks higher than that of George Santayana who wrote: "Those who
cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."1 Given the
burgeoning interest exhibited by modem legal scholars in the
development of law and of legal doctrine in America, our society
seems hardly likely to fall afoul of Santayana's admonition. Indeed,
much, if not most, historical inquiry undertaken by academic lawyers
is not pursued for its own sake. Rather, delving into the past, distant or
recent, is usually a prologue to opining on what the law should be or
what the future course that law should take, a decidedly Santayanian
view of the value of history to be sure.2
Thus, legal history and law reform, law in the past and what law
should dictate in the future, seem inexorably linked, at least in the
minds of American law professors. Arguably, the nexus between legal
history and law reform advocacy might have the tendency to produce
scholarship that takes a dark view of the rules of the past.3 For if the
goal of historical inquiry by academic lawyers is to justify innovation,
present law (frequently a product of the logic of the past) must be
found wanting. After all, if rules of law work well, why change them?
By its very nature, then, modem American legal discourse, the cult of
law reform and law reformers, suggests that there may well be a better
way of conducting business than presently obtains.
It is not my intention in this Article to suggest that another wellworn adage should be discarded, this one penned by Justice Holmes,
1.

1 GEORGE SANTAYANA, LIFE OF REASON:

OR THE PHASES OF

HuMAN

PROGRESS

284(1905).
2.
One of the incentives for writing for a "dedication issue" is that the usual law
review citation policy of footnoting the obvious is waived. In my contribution, I shall take
full advantage of the dispensation granted. However, if the reader peruses each of the
articles cited below, the point suggested in the text here is amply supported. See, e.g., Mark
L. Ascher, CurtailingInheritedWealth, 89 MIcH. L. RE. 69, 70-76 (1990) (examining past
practice and proposing new practices); John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the
Wills Act, 88 HARv.L. REv. 489, 489-91 (1975) (reviewing the history of the Wills Act to
support a proposal of the adoption of use of the substantial compliance doctrine); James
Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirementfor Wills, 68 N.C. L. REv. 541, 547-56

(1990) (reviewing attestation requirement's history to support proposal to abolish it).
3.
No one seems to have much good to say about the Statute of Wills, 1837, 7 Will.
4 & 1 Vict., ch. 26 (Eng.). For a discussion of its flaws, and in particular some of the
reasons why certain of its formalities are outdated, see Lindgren, supra note 2, at 548-50.
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that "[ilt is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that
so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV."4 Reform of law there
must be, and even cursory inquiry into the history of rules may be a
useful entry point into understanding the logic of a particular rule of
law under observation. Yet one may be struck by the failure of zealous
law reformers to appreciate a simple proposition: that what appears to
the modem eye as archaic law may well have been (and likely was) the
law reform of a previous generation. As such, something can be
learned by modem law reformers by an investigation into the problems
that led earlier lawyers down the road to the legal change now
regarded as antiquated, lest the redrafting of law lead to a resurrection
of problems hitherto laid to rest.
Having raised cosmic issues touching the value of historical
inquiry and the use of history by lawyers, I must concede that my focus
in this Article will be far more modest. I wish to consider a specific
area of reform embodied in the 1990 changes in the Uniform Probate
Code, the so-called "dispensing power" that may be applied to wills
that do not meet the requirements of due execution, revocation,
alteration, and revival specified in the Code to allow them to be
admitted to probate (or revoked or revived).- In large measure, the
adoption of the dispensing power by the drafters of the Code and the
proffered transmogrification of the contract concept of "substantial
compliance" into the law of wills reverse the reform of earlier willmaking practice, often regarded by modem wills scholars as
"formalistic," 6 embodied in the English Statute of Frauds of 16777 and
the Statute of Wills of 1837.8 The former was received into the law of
American jurisdictions as part of the statutory law of England, and the
latter was widely imitated in the nineteenth century by individual state
legislatures.9

4.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469
(1897).
5.
U.P.C. § 2-503 (1993).
6.
Lindgren, supra note 2, at 548.
7.
Statute for the Prevention of Fraud and Pejuries, 1676, 29 Car. 2, ch. 3 (Eng.).
8.
Statute of Wills, 1837,7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., ch. 26 (Eng.).
9.
For some reason, the rather cursory treatment of the question of why American
jurisdictions adopted the Wills Act in THOMAS E. ATKiNSON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
Wu.LTs (2d ed. 1953) is cited as authority by some modem scholars. See, e.g., Lindgren,
supra note 2, at 548.
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Although I am skeptical of this reform, it is not my intention in
this Article to hark back to the bad old days when formalism reigned
unchallenged in the law of wills and trusts-when, so it would appear,
probate courts took great delight in reversing the testamentary desires
of the decedent in the name of conformance to arcane requirements. 0
Rather, I wish to suggest only that some of the law reform in the past
(and in particular the due execution statutes) was not without purpose;
second, that some of the rules in their day made sense; and finally, that
we may be inviting back, in the name of law reform, those ills our
forebearers cured by reforming their own reform of due execution and
revocation of wills.
With this agenda in mind, I shall consider the reasons why the
English Statute of Frauds may have been enacted, particularly insofar
as it applied to wills of personal property. My own contribution will
be a preliminary report on an on-going study of later seventeenthcentury probate litigation, disputes which I believe may have
contributed to Parliamentary intervention. Secondly, I shall cover
some results of another ongoing study, that of modem undue influence
cases. Finally, I shall consider, on the basis of my historical and
contemporary research, what aspects of probate law may be in need of
attention. Let us first however consider that which the drafters of the
1990 Uniform Probate Code have wrought with respect to formality of
execution.
.

THE "LANGBEIN REVOLUTION" IN DuE EXECUTION
REQUIREMENTS

The 1990 revision of the Uniform Probate Code makes only
modest alterations in the requirements for due execution of written
wills." Accordingly, wills in writing must be signed by the testator or
another in the testator's "conscious presence," rather than in his mere
"presence" ;12 and instead of remaining silent as to the interval between
when the witness observes the testator's signature or acknowledgment
that witness to sign "within a
and his signing, the Code requires
3
viewing.'
so
after
reasonable time"

10.

Lindgren, supra note 2, at 547-50.

11.
12.
13.

U.P.C. § 2-502 (1993).
Id. § 2-502(a)(2).
Id. § 2-502(a)(3).
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Yet lurking in the subsequent section of the Uniform Probate
Code is revision in will execution that is nothing short of
insurrection. 4 For the drafters of the Code have succumbed to
Professor John Langbein's fascination with the remedy for defective
execution of wills known as the "dispensing power."15 Under the
mandate of section 2-503, if a court is satisfied that "a document ...
not executed in compliance with section 2-502" (due execution)
represents the testamentary intentions of the decedent,
the court should
16
probate.
to
document
nonconforming
admit the
Perhaps it bears repetition to explain precisely why the
dispensing power is so revolutionary a concept in the otherwise dour
law of wills: It is simply because conformity to fixed formalities in the
execution of wills was hitherto calculated to demonstrate that the
decedent actually wanted the document so executed to stand as his
will. The notion, then, that a nonconforming document could be
intended as a will would be regarded by previous generations of
probate lawyers as nonsense. If one intended a document to be a will,
one executed it in conformity with the statute; if one did not so
execute, then it was conclusively presumed that one could not have
intended the writing to stand as a will.
It is not difficult to discover from where the impetus for law
reform sprang. Cases arose in which the "nonsense," as I have called
it, could be disproved. 7 We all make mistakes, testators included.
Kindhearted judges shuddered at the notion of relegating to the dustbin
wills that were clearly intended to be effective, but ran afoul of one or
more of the execution formalities. How could a judge in good
conscience actually write that he was persuaded that the will
14. See iU2 § 2-503 (1993) (allowing court to excuse "harmless error" through use of
dispensing power).
15. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of
Wills: A Report on Australia's Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1
(1987). Although I may disagree with Professor Langbein's desire to remedy defectively
executed wills, I am impressed with the strength of conviction in his argument. All teachers

of trusts and estates are indebted to him for having provided an interesting context for
discussing the otherwise tedious subject of due execution of wills.
16. U.P.C. § 2-503 (1993). In fact, the section goes further than due execution of
wills, and applies the dispensing power to revocation, modification, and revival.
17. See, e.g., In re Fernandez' Estate, 413 A.2d 998, 1000-01 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1980) (upholding admission to probate where witnesses hostile to inheritors denied
knowledge that they were witnessing signing of will); Langbein, supra note 2, at 498-503;
Lindgren, supra note 2, at 548-49.

1898

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:1893

articulated the decedent's testamentary desires and then find it invalid
merely because one of the witnesses was walking out of an unheated
dining room when the other ("somewhat cumbrous in his
movements") was walking in?1 8 More lenient courts fashioned
remedies either by stretching the obvious dictates of statute, or by
recognizing unexceptional exceptions to clear provisions of law, or by
simply looking the other way. All these horrors were created in the
name of a perceived good-the implementation of testators' estate
9
plans.1

One cannot but agree that there was something sinister about this
remedial jurisprudence. In the first place, there was a certain
incongruence in judicial intervention: remedies were haphazardly
applied. Some wills that seemed to fall afoul of the formalities
mandated by statute passed muster; others in arguably similar
circumstances did not. And second, and perhaps more importantly,
there was a degree of dishonesty, or at the very least disingenuity, in
the decisions rendered by some courts. After all, courts either should
follow the law or admit that they will not; when they bend law, they
ought to be decent enough to admit their indiscretion. This allows the
legislator to have the final word by altering common law by statute, a
proposition to which even the most avid common lawyer like Sir
Edward Coke would ascribe. 20 Moreover, dishonesty or disingenuity
produces case law with logic expressed by judges supporting their
decisions that is jurisprudentially unsatisfying. Hard cases make
awkward law.
The gruesome alternative faced by probate courts in cases in
which the testator or his scrivener ran afoul of the rules, either by
judicial subversion of legislative mandate or magisterial disdain for the
testamentary desires of the property owner, troubled academic lawyers,
most notably, Professor John Langbein.2"
The dilemma of a
piecemeal, capricious remedy or the thwarting of expressed
testamentary desires inspired him to urge the application of the
contract doctrine of substantial compliance to the law of wills. In his
seminal article, Langbein argued that modem probate courts continue
to require blindly strict compliance to archaic rules of due execution
18.
19.
20.
21.

In re Groffman, 2 All E.R. 108, 111-12 (1969).
Langbein, supra note 2, at 500.
Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638-41 (K.B. 1584).
Langbein, supra note 2, at 498-99.
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even though the purposes which the rules once served are no longer
relevant or even satisfied by the requirement. Langbeifn attacked the
rule of literal compliance to due execution statutes as a "snare for the
ignorant and ill-advised," and "a needless hangover from a time when
the law of proof was in its infancy." 22 Moreover, he noted the
tendency towards premortem intergenerational transfer in post-war
America,' a movement which he has subsequently called a
"revolution in family wealth transmission." 24 If much or most wealth
now passes between the generations by documents and acts which do
not and need not conform to the requirements of due execution, why
then retain, Langbein queried, the hoary formalities of due execution
with respect to wills?25
Among its many virtues and modest drawbacks, one argument in
favor of the utilization of the doctrine of substantial compliance was
ease of application. 26 All a court has to do to implement the doctrine
of substantial compliance in a particular case is to survey the testator's
actual behavior to determine whether it approximated the dictates of
the formalities of due execution articulated in the Wills Act. If the
testator's conduct is close enough to prescribed formality to satisfy the
functions that the breached rule or rules were calculated to serve, then
the will should be admitted to probate regardless of its technical
imperfection.27
Moreover, the application of substantial compliance to the law of
wills had another virtue, the familiar ring which the concept had in the
minds of modem lawyers. Lawyers and judges had already had the
doctrine of substantial performance and its logic drummed into their
consciousness in the sales class offered in the first year of law school.
Why not extend its ambit into other areas of the law?
Although the adaptation of the concept of substantial compliance
from contract to will was recognizable, the fit was not theoretically
perfect. Some lawyers might regard "substantial compliance" as more
appropriate in the jurisprudence which spawned it, contract law. In
contract law, substantial performance is an interpretive tool to gauge
22.
23.

24.
25.
26.
27.

l at 531.
Id. at 497.
Id; see Ascher, supranote 2, at 107-08.

Langbein, supra note 2, at 512-13; see Ascher, supranote 2, at 107-08.
Langbein, supra note 2, at 513.
Id
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performance of obligations under an agreement, a sphere of human
activity in which commitments incurred are not clearly defined, and
therefore more subject to disputes in interpretation; 28 it is not a
doctrine adopted by courts to vary a legislative directive that is clear on
29
its face.
At least in America, the widespread adoption by courts of
substantial compliance was not to be. In a number of jurisdictions,
courts prior to 1990 were invited to apply it, but it has been argued that
all courts which considered the Langbein brief ultimately declined.30
Rather than admit that courts had the ability to craft a separate generic
remedy for all forms of noncompliance under the rubric of "substantial
compliance," courts continued their practice of selectively admitting to
probate wills with particular defects by employing other remedies on
the ad-hoc basis that so troubled Langbein.3 '

III.

THE CuRIouS HISTORY OF Tm DOCTRINE OF SUBSTANTIAL
COMPLIANCE

Or did they? Two points should be noted before concluding that
substantial compliance as a doctrine has been rejected in the context of
wills. The first is that even prior to Langbein's article, some courts
were not unsympathetic to arguments of "substantial compliance."
And second, there is indeed one jurisdiction that seems to be rather
avid in its support for its application. Interestingly, the most
enthusiastic support for the application of the doctrine of substantial
compliance to the interpretation of due execution requirements came
from a rather odd quarter: Louisiana.
Turning to the first point, courts even prior to Langbein's article
occasionally admitted a will that imperfectly conformed to due
28. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTmACTS 5.11.18(b) (3d ed. 1987) (defining substantial performance); 2 E. Au.AN FARNSWORTH,
CoNmTcrs § 8.12 (1990) (explaining substantial performance).
29. Langbein, supra note 2, at 530.
30. See, e.g., In re Estate of Lahr, 744 P.2d 1267, 1270-71 (Okla. 1987) (rejecting
use of substantial compliance); Succession of King, 595 So. 2d 805, 808-09 (La. Ct. App.
2d Cir.) (finding substantial compliance insufficient), writ denied, 598 So. 2d 357 (La.
1992); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 708 S.W.2d 31, 32 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (rejecting substantial
compliance doctrine). For a detailed discussion, see C. Douglas Miller, Will Formality,
JudicialFormalism, and Legislative Reform: An Examination of the New Uniform Probate
Code "HarmlessError"Rule and the Movement Toward Amorphism, 43 FLA. L. REV. 167,
308-11 (1991) (examining Langbein's concept in American courts).
31. Langbein, supra note 2, at 504-09.
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execution requirements to probate by considering that the document
substantially complied with the relevant Wills Act. Some courts did
so explicitly, others by implication. For example, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court twice in the late 1960s and early 1970s affirmed the
prior adoption of the principle of substantial compliance (and the
express use of the term) with the formalities prescribed by the state's
will execution statute.32 Likewise, the California Supreme Court
required only "substantial compliance" with due execution formalities
as early as 1905. 33 Adherence to the doctrine of substantial
compliance was reaffirmed with respect to attested wills in 1944,34 and
applied to holographs in 1963." 5
Other courts prior to Langbein's article admitted nonconforming
wills to probate by employing the spirit of substantial compliance, if
not by borrowing the actual term. For example, as early as 1892, the
California Supreme Court admitted a will to probate in which an
illiterate testator made her mark as permitted by statute.36 The Civil
Code required a witness to the will to write the name of the testator
"near" the mark. This was not done; the testatrix's name appeared
only in the body of the will. The court admitted the will to probate
considering that the name was "near enough ... to satisfy the
requirement of section 14 of the Civil Code." 37 Other cases from
different jurisdictions took a similar approach: allowing wills that do
not conform to the letter of due execution statutes by considering the
will to have approximated the dictates of their Wills Act.38
Having illustrated the history of the doctrine of substantial
compliance "before Langbein," we may now turn to the Louisiana
experience. For the purposes of due execution of wills, the law of
Louisiana varies little from what is referred to here as "the common
law." Indeed, according to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, the
legislature "adopted the statutory will from the common law in order

32. Hobbs v. Mahoney, 478 P.2d 956, 958 (Okla. 1970); In re Cutsinger's Estate,
445 P.2d 778, 782 (Okla. 1968).
33. In re Seaman's Estate, 80 P. 700,702 (Cal. 1905).
34. In re Simmons' Estate, 151 P.2d 8, 10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944).
35. In re Baker's Estate, 381 P.2d 913,916 (Cal. 1963).
36. In re Guilfoyle's Will, 31 P. 553, 553-54 (Cal. 1892).
37. Id. at 553.
38. See, e.g., Hanel v. Springle, 372 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Ark. 1963); In re Keifer's
Will, 356 N.Y.S.2d 520,522-23 (N.Y. Sur. 1974).
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to avoid the rigid formal requirements" of the civil-law will.39 The
legislature, however, adopted the "common law will" with a
vengeance. The formalities of will execution of statutory wills in
Louisiana incorporates the niceties of the 1837 Wills Act, and adds
some wrinkles of its own.' For example, a statutory will must be
notarized, and each separate page of the instrument must be signed by
the testator.4 ' Moreover, the legislation creates a signing process for
physically infirmed testators who cannot write their names. 42 A further
separate section sets forth requirements of due execution of wills of
the "sight impaired." 43
With these rather exacting requirements for the due execution of
a will on the books, it should come as no surprise that cases arose in
which testators failed to observe strictly the requirements set out by
statute. In a recent case, for example, the testator initialed rather than
signed the first page of his will.44 The Louisiana Third Circuit Court
of Appeal admitted the will to probate, noting that substantial
compliance with the statute was all that was required. According to
the court, "slight departures from form" should be permitted if there is
no "increased likelihood that fraud may have been perpetrated."45
In applying the doctrine of substantial compliance to a case in
which the letter of the requirements for due execution was not
observed, the Squires court followed the jurisprudence of the
Louisiana Supreme Court. The most unambiguous support for the
need for only substantial compliance for a will to be admitted to
probate was articulated in Succession of Guezuraga.46 Here, the court
was faced with the offer for probate of a two-page will in which only
the first page was signed.47 The first page consisted of the dispository
provisions, followed by the testatrix's signature, and then the
beginning of the attestation clause; the following unsigned page
39. Succession of Guezuraga, 512 So. 2d 366, 368 (La. 1987). The statutory will is
the nonholographic will executed with preserved formalities.
40. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2442 (West 1991).
41. Id
42. Id. § 9:2442(c)(1).
43. Id. § 9:2443 (West 1991).
44. Succession of Squires, 640 So. 2d 813, 813 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,
642 So. 2d 199 (La. 1994).
45. I at 815.
46. 512 So. 2d 366 (La. 1987).
47. Id at 367; see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2442(b)(1) (West 1991) (requiring "each
separate page of the instrument" to be signed).
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contained the remainder of the attestation clause. Mindful that no
fraud was alleged, the court found that the legislature intended that the
statute be construed "maintaining the validity of the will if at all
possible, as long as it is in substantial compliance with the statute."4'
Two other Louisiana cases apply the doctrine of substantial
compliance to the due execution of wills of "sight impaired testators."
In the earlier case, Succession of Harvey, the Louisiana Second Circuit
Court of Appeal admitted a will to probate where a witness to the will
rather than the notary, as required by the statute, read the will to the
testator because the latter was suffering from "an allergy and asthma
condition.'4 9 Likewise, substantial compliance was found with the
statute and a will was admitted to probate in Succession of Rogers
even though the attestation clause did not indicate that the will had
been read to the testator by the notary.50 The court noted that even
though the statement that the will was read to the testator by the notary
was required by statute, it really did not matter who read the will aloud
so long as witnesses agreed that the will had been so read.
Yet even in Louisiana, the doctrine of substantial compliance has
been applied sparingly. Perhaps a will without an attestation clause, as
in Succession of English,51 though witnessed and notarized, does not
meet the threshold level of conformity with the statute to begin a
consideration of whether compliance was substantial and fraud absent
as the Louisiana Supreme Court prescribed in Succession of
Guezuraga. Thus, the failure to find substantial compliance in English
may be defensible.
Yet it is more difficult to explain why substantial compliance was
not applied to rescue a faulty attestation clause in Succession of
2
Chabertv. Laborde.Y
Here, the attestation clause was a declaration by
the notary (but not the notary and witnesses as required by statute) that
the will was read and signed on each page by the testator (but not that
the testator also declared the document to be his will and that the
testator, witnesses, and notary all signed in the presence of each
other).53 According to the court, the errors in the attestation clause
48.

49.
50.
1986).
51.
52.
53.

Succession of Guezuraga, 512 So. 2d at 368.

573 So. 2d 1304, 1309 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1991).
494 So. 2d 546,549-50 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 495 So. 2d 290 (La.
508 So. 2d 631 (La Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1987).
507 So. 2d 848 (La. CL App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 508 So. 2d 825 (La. 1987).
Id. at 849.
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(though not apparently in the ceremony of execution) "so far depart-]
from the requirements of the statute, that to recognize it as a valid will
'
would be tantamount to our ignoring these requirements."54
Still unconvinced that Louisiana courts are reluctant to apply
substantial compliance? Consider Succession of Holloway.5 5 The
only requirement to which the attestation clause in this case did not
conform was that it failed to relate the date of the month. Someone,
presumably the notary, had forgotten to insert the day of the month at
the time the attestation clause was notarized. The court affirmed the
lower court's refusal to admit the will to probate on the grounds that
the date was a mandatory requirement and that to admit the will would
be "to rewrite judicially the statute." 56 Or ponder Succession of
Eddy.57 In this case, a form will ("E-Z Legal Form" to be exact),
consisting of a single sheet of paper, was offered for probate. The will
had its dispository provisions on the front of the form and an
attestation clause on the back duly signed by the testatrix and her
witnesses. Unhappily, however, she did not sign on the front of the
form. The will was declared invalid, "on the sole ground that the front
sheet did not bear the signature of the testatrix," and therefore did not
comply with the statute of due execution.58
Perhaps this litany of Louisiana cases confirms the difficulty that
we might find in the application of substantial compliance to the
context of probate law. How does a court draw the line between
insufficient and sufficient proximation of the statutory requirements of
due execution? Precisely when is compliance "substantial"? When
did the last will and testament get "close enough" to meeting the
statutory requirements?
In fact, after due consideration of foreign case law, Langbein
abandoned substantial compliance, and switched his allegiance to
another vehicle to implement defectively executed wills, that of the
dispensing power.59 Under the dispensing power as it applied to
nonconforming wills, a court may admit a will with some defect in the
formalities of due execution mandated by statute to probate if the
54. Id.
55. 511 So. 2d 1274 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.), aff'd, 531 So. 2d 825 (La. 1987).
56. Id at 1277.
57. 664 So. 2d 853 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1995).
58. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2442(b)(1) (West 1991) (requiring "each separate page
of the instrument" to be signed).
59. See Langbein, supra note 15, at 1, 7.
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proponent of the will demonstrates nevertheless that the decedent
intended the document to be her will.60 Thus, the inquiry of the court
in determining whether to apply the dispensing power varies modestly
from the investigation undertaken in applying the remedy of
substantial compliance. Theoretically, in the latter, the court should
examine whether the actual execution formalities observed sufficiently
approximate the dictates of statute; while in the former, the court's
concern should be whether, regardless of the formalities observed, the
will represents the testamentary desires of the decedent. 61 Although
articulated in different terms, arguably, the two separate inquiries in
applying substantial compliance and the dispensing power should be
imagined as close kin: A court should determine that a will represents
the testamentary desires of the decedent (dispensing power logic)
precisely because it was executed in near conformity (though not
perfectly so) with the appropriate statute of due execution (substantial
compliance logic).
Yet, as Langbein's empirical studies indicated, the application of
the two doctrines in separate states in Australia seemed to achieve
varied results.62 In his view, Australian courts were better able to
fashion remedies for failure to conform to the letter of will execution
by use of the dispensing power than through the doctrine of substantial
compliance. By adopting the narrowest of definitions of "substantial"
in applying the doctrine, courts in Queensland, according to Langbein,
subverted the intention of the principle. The only cases in which
compliance was regarded as substantial were cases in which
compliance was literal. Thus, the acceptance of the doctrine of
substantial compliance had insubstantial effect.63 On the other hand,
even a narrow application of the dispensing power in South Australia
(narrow because the proponent of a noncomplying will was required to
demonstrate that the decedent desired a document to stand as her will
"beyond a reasonable doubt") resulted in a higher proportion of
noncomplying wills being admitted to probate than in Queensland. 64
No doubt influenced by Langbein's conversion experience, the
Uniform Probate Code (U.P.C.) accepted the dispensing power in its
60.

Id. at 6-7.

61.

Id

62.
63.
64.

Id. at 41.
Id at 51-54.
d at 53.
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1990 revisions. Unlike South Australia, however, the U.P.C. adopted
an evidentiary burden that is more appropriate to civil matters than the
Queensland benchmark. The proponent of the will that does not
conform perfectly to the requirements of due execution embodied in
statute must prove testamentary desire "by clear and convincing
evidence." 65
The battle for the hearts and minds of the academic elite has been
won; it now remains to be seen how legislatures and courts will
respond to section 2-503. If they are guided by the academic
community, we might expect to see adoption of the dispensing power.
Although, as discussed above,66 American courts had given Langbein's
plea for adopting substantial compliance a cool reception, 67 academic
commentators are nearly uniform in their support for a broad remedy
for validating wills that do not conform to the letter of will execution
statutes.68 Indeed, retaining a policy of strict compliance with
legislatively mandated formalities has found almost no support among
scholars.6 9 Commentators may be rightly accused of attempting to
outdo each other in decrying judicial formalism and disparaging the
hoary requirements of the old Statute of Frauds and Statute of Wills.
One iconoclastically minded scholar went even further than did
advocates of substantial compliance and the dispensing power, and
urged the abandonment of the attestation requirement altogether.70
Where might all this abandonment of formalism end?
IV. PossiBLE CONSEQUENCES

OF THE ADOPTION OF SECTIoN 2-503

We may now turn to the likely effects of widespread adoption of
the dispensing power by American jurisdictions. Those academic
commentators who decry the formalism in the law of wills do not
propose to abandon testators and their wills altogether to designs of
others who might subvert their testamentary desires. 7 1 For it must be
remembered that the formalities of execution, in particular the
65. U.P.C. § 2-503 (1993).
66. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
67. Perhaps the tide has turned, see In re Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339, 1342 (N.J.
1991) and supranotes 45-48 and accompanying text.
68. Lindgren, supranote 2, at 547-56; Bruce H. Mann, Formalitiesand Formalism
in the Uniform ProbateCode, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1033, 1033 (1994).
69. With the exception of C. Douglas Miller, supranote 30.
70. Lindgren, supranote 2, at 547-556.
71. Langbein, supra note 2, at 491-96; Lindgren, supranote 2, at 547-56.
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signature and witnessing requirements which probate lawyers and their
clients seem so routinely to miff, serve particular functions; they were
not merely designed as traps for the unwary! 2 Let us consider the
possible consequences of the adoption of the dispensing power in
relation to the functions of formalities.
A detailed outline of the functions of formalities of will
execution embodied in the Wills Acts need not detain us here; they
have been ably rehearsed by others! 3 Suffice it to say that the solemn
conclave required by statute at which the signature and attestation of
wills must occur serves four separate, though interrelated functions.
First, there is a "ritual function"; the gathering of testator and her
witnesses is calculated to remind the testatrix that she is up to serious
business. 74 Second, this same assemblage also serves a "protective
function," since it is less likely that fraud and deceit, undue influence,
and the like can be perpetrated under the gaze of witnesses.75 The
signatures of the testatrix and her witnesses also serve a third function,
an "evidentiary function," allowing the probate court perhaps many
years after execution to be certain that this document is the one that
manifested the testatrix's testamentary intent? 6 Finally, there is the
"channeling function"; a prescribed method of execution allows for a
more efficient process of probate?!7 If all wills are executed according
to a single pattern, courts will spend less time determining whether a
document offered for probate was really intended by the decedent to be
a will rather than some other writing.
With these functions of formalities of will execution in mind, we
may now consider the extent to which the adoption of the dispensing
power or the application of substantial compliance to the law of wills
impairs their value. Most academic commentators seem undisturbed
at the loss the adoption of either remedial doctrine would engender'
In large measure, then, advocates of the adoption of the dispensing
72. The classic rendition of the functions is that of Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine
J. Tilson, Classificationof GratuitousTransfers,51 YAi.EL.J. 1, 5-13 (1941).
73. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 2, at 491-96; Lindgren, supra note 2, at 547-54;
Mann, supra note 68, at 1058-62.
74. Gulliver & Tilson, supranote 72, at 5-6.
75. Id. at 9-13.
76. Id. at 6-9.
77. Langbein, supra note 2, at 493-94.
78. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 72, at 10-13; Langbein, supra note 2, at 530;
Mann, supra note 68, at 1061-62.
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power believe that the functions of formalities are either irrelevant in
modem society or are served in another fashion.79 Accordingly, a
conclave, solemn or otherwise, is regarded as being unnecessary to
bring to the attention of a testator that the moment of the execution of
a will is an important one; the law has developed more effective means
of authenticating documents than the signature of witnesses; and there
is always the possibility of setting aside wills on the grounds of undue
influence and fraud. 80 Thus, the evidentiary function can be served by
handwriting analysis; the ability of a contestant of a will to overturn an
ill-procured document on the grounds of undue influence or fraud
satisfies the protective function.8 ' Accordingly, Professor James
Lindgren, a forceful opponent of formalism, argues that fraud in the
execution of wills is uncommon, 2 and Lindgren suggests that the
protective function is anachronistic because both fraud and undue
influence can always be proved to overturn a will.8"
I wonder. Such reliance upon the ability of an individual to prove
undue influence or fraud is both interesting and curious given the fact
that the Code itself does not mention either, save to say that the
contestants alleging either have the burden of proof and persuasion in
testacy proceedings. 84 It may not be surprising that the promulgators
of the Code have refrained from articulating the elements of undue
influence, because they are well-known: susceptibility of a testator to
the coercion of another; the opportunity for that person to influence; a
motive to do so; and
the "substitution" of the will of the procurer for
85
testator.
the
of
that
Yet the ease with which "black letter law" may be recited says
nothing about the difficulty that courts have in applying those same
rules. The cases in this area of probate law are notoriously hazy.
Susceptibility, opportunity, and motive are easy standards to articulate
as well as to prove. Substitution of testamentary volition, however, is
another matter. It has been and remains particularly difficult for courts
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Langbein, supranote 2, at 496 (citing Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 72, at 10).
Lindgren, supranote 2, at 562.
Langbein, supranote 2, at 515-18.
Lindgren, supra note 2, at 555, 562.
Id. at 562.
U.P.C. § 3-407 (1993).
The classic formulation of Lord Hannen from which the following summary is
derived is reproduced in JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, Wn.LS, TRUSTS, AND
ESTTES 160-61 (5th ed. 1995).

1996]

DUE EXECUTION OF WILLS

1909

to draw a precise line between conduct that should be regarded as
acceptable encouragement of a testator by an individual who wishes to
secure a legacy and what constitutes impermissible coercion when the
conduct of those involved in the will execution drama is so individual.
Rather like snowflakes, no two undue influence cases are alike. Juries
take advantage of such fact-based litigation by not infrequently
revising the estate plan of a testatrix when, in their view, she may not
have distributed her property to those whom they regard as "natural
objects" of her bounty.86 Setting aside a will or a part thereof on the
ground of undue influence often allows some or all of the testatrix's
estate to pass to her intestate heirs. Jurors (perhaps assuming that the
testatrix's close kin are more deserving than their own) may find such
a result "fairer." Of course, an appellate court may reverse a jury
verdict because the evidence of substitution is insufficient, but judges
can only do so by substituting their own intuition as to whether
coercion has in fact occurred. To borrow Justice Stewart's adage
regarding pornography to the law of wills; we know undue influence
in a case when we see it. 7
And we see it often. I have undertaken a comprehensive study of
cases of undue influence that have reached appellate courts since 1970,
but it is not as yet completed. My primary interest in the investigation
is to ascertain the factual variables under which wills contested on the
ground of undue influence were executed. 88 Each year, probate cases
appear in American appellate courts in which undue influence plays a
substantial role. By substantial I mean that the written opinion
addressed in some detail the question of whether a will was procured
by undue influence.8 9 In a large proportion of the cases, the will

86. See infra note 88.
87. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I shall
not today attempt further to define [hard-core pornography] .... But I know it when I see it
88.

In particular, I wanted to know the age of the testator/testatrix, the relationship

between the alleged undue influencer and the testator/testatrix, the relationship between the
contestant and the testator/testatrix, and the parties to each other, whether the will was
drafted by a lawyer, the finder of fact, and the determination of the case.
89. Since 1970, 513 cases have discussed in detail issues of undue influence, on
average 20.5 per year. A lengthy description of each case is on file with the Tulane Law
Review.
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subject to contest on the ground of undue influence was not set aside,
at least not on that account. 90
Yet even this rather healthy mass of appeals cases is only the tip
of a larger litigation iceberg. Since not all contested will probates are
the subject of appeals, a larger number of wills must have raised
suspicions of undue influence at probate, but went no further up the
judicial ladder. Even though the "protective function" embodied in the
formalities of execution may operate imperfectly to limit the numbers
of cases of undue influence, should more responsibility be foisted on
this rather tired concept by adopting the dispensing power or the
application of substantial compliance? Could we expect it to shoulder
cases which heretofore were resolved by reference to the formalities of
execution?
V.

LESSONS FROM THE PAST THE ENACTMENT OF THE STA
FRAUDS

OF

At this juncture, re-enter Santayana. History, or at least the
historical research which I am undertaking, would suggest not. Our
time is not the only one in which cases of undue influence are
abundant. Over the course of the last couple of years, I have been
engaged in an investigation of probate litigation in the Prerogative
Court of Canterbury during the second half of the seventeenth
century.9 For the uninitiated, the PCC (as it is frequently referred to)
had jurisdiction over the probate of wills and the granting of
administrations of intestates' estates for those who left personal
property in excess of £5 within boundaries of the province of
Canterbury.92 While the PCC was only one of hundreds of other
jurisdictions in England which held the right to probate wills until the
creation of a centralized system of will registers in 1858, 93 it was the
most prominent. The concern of my research was to ponder (among
other things) whether the rather enigmatic sections 18 through 21 of

90. in 170 of the 513 cases (33.1%), the will was overturned on the ground of undue
influence; in the remaining 343, the will was sustained.
91. Reference to this work in progress is lightly footnoted. In excess of a thousand
documents have been consulted, and when the research has been completed a thoroughly
documented version will be presented.
92. That is, England, south of the River Humber.
93. But it was in a sense the court of the rich and famous, and more to the point,
from the perspective of the historian, is the fact that its records survive.
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the Statute of Frauds,94 which governed the validity and probate of
nuncupative wills of personal property, were enacted in response to
actual problems with their probate as perceived by Parliament.
Let us briefly observe the provisions of the infamous Act for the
Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries enacted in 1676 which deal with
wills. 9 Among its other concerns, the Act governed two aspects of
will-making. With regard to wills of lands and tenements, the Statute
of Frauds required that the document purporting to be the will of a
decedent be in writing, signed by the testator, and witnessed by three
or more credible witnesses. 96 The statute also prescribed the means by
which such wills were to be revoked.'
But the Statute of Frauds went further in the area of probate of
wills than merely requiring a writing for a will of land to be effective;
it also reformed an area of will-making that had been exclusively the
province of the church courts: the nuncupative will of personal
property. Although confirming the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical
courts in the probate of wills and the granting of administrations of
personalty, Parliament created a set of substantive requirements for the
validity of oral wills of personal estates valued in excess of £30. First,
the statute required three persons "that the Testator at the time of
pronouncing the same, [e.g., his oral will] did bid the persons present,
or some of them, bear witness, that such was his Will." 98 Secondly, the
words had to have been spoken in the last illness of the deceased. 99
Thirdly, there was a "venue" requirement; with regard to nuncupative
wills of persons with estates in excess of £30, the words alleged to
have been a will had to have been spoken in the decedent's "habitation
or dwelling, or where he or she hath been resident for the space of ten
days or more next before the making of such Will, except where such
person was surprised or taken sick, being from his own home, and
died before he returned to the place of his of her dwelling. ' '1°
The statute also regulated two aspects of procedure in the church
courts with regard to the probate of nuncupative wills. Testimony
94. Statute for the Prevention of Fraud and Pejuries, 1676, 29 Car. 2, ch. 3, §§ 1821 (Eng.).

95.

Id.

96.

Id. § 5.

97.

Id. §6.

98. Id. § 18.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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proving the validity of such wills had to have been received by the
court within the period of six months, except if the testimony "or
substance thereof' was committed to writing within sixdays after the
making of the will. 101 A further section of the Statute required that
letters testamentary not be granted by the court until fourteen days after
the death of the testator, and that no nuncupative will be proved unless
the widow or next of kin be summoned to court to contest the probate
of the oral will.'0 2 Finally, the statute limited the ability to revoke a
clause, devise, or bequest in a written will by "word of mouth."'0 3
Hereafter, the words spoken that were purported to have revocatory
force had to be reduced to writing in the lifetime
of the testator, read to
4
him or her, and be assented to by the testator.i1
These sections of the Statute of Frauds are particularly curious for
two reasons. In the first place, they appeared to be locked onto a
statute whose primary concern lay elsewhere: regularizing the transfer
of land.0l" And second, these seven sections of the Statute of Frauds
intervened in the process of succession to property to an extent hitherto
unknown and governed procedure in the church courts with respect to
probate, and the even more rare sphere of legislative intrusion 3 6
Taken together, then, the reforms generated by the Statute suggest that
there was concern in Parliament over questions of authenticity with
respect to nuncupative wills. My inquiry into probate disputes will
shed light on the extent to which nuncupative wills may have
presented problems to probate courts.
Space constraints do not permit a full exposition on the records of
the PCC which I have used for my study of probate litigation, nor its
results. Suffice it to say that I have read and transcribed the surviving
Allegations, Answers, Interrogatories, Depositions, Cause Papers, and
Sentences of a sample of 184 probate cases commenced between 1661
and 1696.107 The validity of nuncupative wills looms large among the
101. Id. § 19.
102. Id. § 20.
103. Id. § 21.
104. Id.
105. Phillip A. Hamburger, The Conveyancing Purposesof the Statute of Frauds,27
L. & HIS. REV. 354 (1983).
106. Statute for the Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, 1676, 29 Car. 2, ch. 3, §§ 1824 (Eng.).
107. It remains to describe my data set of late seventeenth-century causes from which
my conclusions will be drawn. To construct it, I used a sampling technique that was hardly
sophisticated. Each year, the PCC heard in the neighborhood of 150 to 200 contested
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issues litigated in the PCC during the period. In twenty-six of the 184
cases (14.1%), the issues of the validity of an oral utterance and of
whether the expression amounted to a nuncupative will was litigated.
The validity of oral wills offered for probate by executors or
beneficiaries therein was contested because of the somewhat dubious
circumstances in which they were made. After all, oral wills were no
more than declarations, and both the question of testamentary intent,
whether the utterance was intended by the decedent as a will, and the
exact dispository terms could be proved only by the recollections of
witnesses. An example from the cases can be provided. Gregory
Thomed was a Gentleman of the Chappel Royal and comes down to
us by all accounts as rather a hale and hearty fellow. The utterance
which was alleged to have been his nuncupative will was made in an
alehouse shortly before his demise. The contestant of the will
attempted to cast doubt on Gregory's intent not only based upon the
venue, but suggested that he often made statements without serious
purpose, and that he himself so recognized:
4. If someone flattered him he might say he would give him his
estate and if asked the day after Gregory Thorned would smile and say
"you know that when I am merry
108I doe and would bid them not to take
any notice of what hee did say."
probate causes (though many were pending over two or more years, so the precise number
of causes commenced in each year was probably toward the lower end of the scale).
Allegations survive for only about one-half of these causes: 75 to 100 per annum.
Constraints of time (and patience) would not allow me to scrutinize every cause commenced
in the forty years after 1660 for which an allegation has been preserved. I therefore resolved
to observe causes at five-year intervals, from 1660-1696, and sample within the selected
year. I began with the period 1660-1666, because these years saw relatively few causes, and
the Allegations had been placed together by the archivist in the same bundle. Thereafter, I
looked at the bundles catalogued for 1671, 1676, 1681, 1686, 1691, and 1696. In each
bundle, I included every fifth cause, with the exception of 1676, a year in which I read every
cause with an Allegation in the bundle. Because the PCC testamentary causes have a
nominal index by decedent, I was able to follow the cause if it continued in subsequent or
preceding years; if, for example, there were further allegations submitted by a proponent or
contestant in the following year, I was able to find them; and if a cause commenced in 1670
produced an allegation in 1671, I included the cause in the sample and read the earlier
allegation.
My efforts produced 184 probate causes. I would estimate that somewhere in the order
of 5250 to 7000 (150 x 35 to 200 x 35) causes came before the court during the last forty
years of the seventeenth century of which about 1800 to 2300 left surviving allegations, so
my sample might range from about 3 to 4% of all causes commenced and about 8 to 10% of
the cases initiated for which allegations have survived.
108. Public Records Office [P.R.O.], London PROB 18/3/28 (1676).
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In the cases, it was common for contestants of nuncupative wills
to challenge both the memory and the honesty of the witnesses to the
will through interrogatories. Recollection was tested by asking the
witnesses to depose upon specifics of the "ceremony": the exact time
that the words were uttered, the precise place (the room in the house),
and even how (and with what) the deceased was propped in his bed.
Because there was often no other evidence than the bare word of the
proponent and her witnesses, their character was often at issue. For
example, what began as a fairly straightforward offer to probate a
nuncupative will by one Rebecca Sewell was supported by the
testimony of Richard Simmons (Simmons was alleged to have been
present at the time of its making) was transformed into an
investigation through other witnesses of his fame as a receiver of
stolen goods." 9 Likewise, a shopkeeper was produced by the
contestants of the will to testify that a character witness for Simmons,
one Elizabeth Williams, stole some lace from her and that she had
identified the same woman at Newgate prison."'
All but two of the controversies over nuncupative wills involved
wills uttered prior to 1677. The two post-1677 causes involved the
wills of mariners whose wills were exempt from the reform.'
The
Statute of Frauds had indeed removed from the PCC a particularly
troubling genre of probate dispute. Tightening the requirements for
the validity of wills decreased the quantity of litigation therein.
Yet, arguably, the reforms embodied in the Statute of Frauds
should be regarded as regressive, particularly when measured by the
logic of modem academic commentators who are proponents of the
dispensing power. After all, Gregory Thomed may have wished to
have disposed of his property in that alehouse. Why not allow the
proponents of his utterance to demonstrate that he desired the
statement to stand as his will by clear and convincing evidence? And,
if he so intended the utterance to be his will, but was "merry" or
"flattered," let the contestants of his will so prove undue influence or
lack of testamentary capacity.
What separates the advocates of the Statute of Frauds and those
of the dispensing power is not merely three centuries, but a
109. P.R.O., 24/14,362.
110. P.R.O., 24/14,365.
111. Statute for the Prevention of Fraud and Perjuries, 1676, 29 Car. 2, ch. 3, § 22
(Eng.).
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fundamental difference on the extent to which the law ought to protect
the designs of the eccentric or ill-advised testator. The Uniform
Probate Code has moved ever farther in the direction of forebearance
with a misplaced reliance on undue influence as a backstop. Indeed,
those who regard the law on nuncupative wills to be arcane and
irrelevant should consider the latitude given to settlers under the
Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act. 2 As Professors
Dukeminier and Johanson illustrate in a problem following the
discussion of pour-over wills in their casebook, their hypothetical dear
Aunt Fanny can make an oral disposition of trust property to take
effect after her
death if she has reserved the power to do so in the trust
13
instrument
VI. LESSONS FROM THE PAST: UNDUE INFLUENCE AS A BACKSTOP

My argument thus far has been that the tightening of the
requirements for the validity of one particularly troublesome type of
will, the nuncupative will, decreased the quantity of probate litigation
in the past. Admittedly, it did so by requiring a channeling of
testamentary behavior in ways in which modem law reformers appear
disinclined to accept. That which a previous society regarded as an
intolerable drag on the process of probate may well be a burden that
modem society wishes probate courts in our day to shoulder.
Moreover, demonstrating that tightening the requirements may have
eliminated litigation in the past does not of course prove the converse:
that relaxing formalities (either in the past or in the present) will
increase litigation. Yet it does suggest a link between the prescribed
formalities of execution and probate litigation that should serve as a
salutary reminder for advocates of the dispensing power and the
application of the concept of substantial compliance to the law of
wills.
Having delved into the probate litigation of an earlier age, the
Santayanian has one further reflection for those who wish to be certain
that proposed law reform will not resurrect the problems of the past.
Above, it has been noted that the proponents of the adoption of the
dispensing power or the application of the principle of substantial
compliance to the law of wills believe that the ceremony of execution
112. U.P.C. § 2-511 (1993).
113. DUKEMINIR & JOHANSON, supranote 85, at 367.
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either provides little "protection" of the testator from the designs of
others or that the ability to contest a will on the ground of undue
influence affords sufficient protection for the decedent's volition." 4 A
survey of modem cases of undue influence casts some doubt upon the
proposition that the doctrine of undue influence can sustain the
additional burden.1 5
Likewise in the past; or so my inquiry into probate litigation in
the PCC in the second half of the seventeenth century would suggest.
In fact, more of our will contests raised the problem of undue
influence than any other infirmity. In thirty-eight of 184 cases, or
18.5%, the
issue of undue influence in the execution of a will was
116
alleged.
The circumstances surrounding will execution that the contestant
in our PCC cases alleged to support an allegation of undue influence
varied greatly. Yet the factual patterns are strikingly familiar to the
modem student of current probate litigation. At the outset, however, it
must be noted that the use of the term "undue influence" should be
regarded as perhaps anachronistic because contestants themselves
never used the term. Rather, the contestant through his or her
allegation, answer, cross-allegation or answer, or interrogatories
presented to the proponent's witnesses or to his own (or a combination
of the above) attempted to have witnesses testify to dubious conduct
on the part of the proponent or another in securing the writing or
execution of the will." 7
A number of different factual patterns were alleged by
contestants in asserting a claim that the decedent's will was a product
of undue influence. Space constraints herein do not permit a full
exposition of the circumstances alleged in the cases. Control over the
testator, a physically weakened state and undue persuasion, however,
loom large in the cases. The modem student of the law of wills would
be most interested to learn the line between acceptable persuasion and
undue influence that obtained in early modem England, still a

114. See supranotes 60-80 and accompanying text.
115. See supranotes 84-86 and accompanying text.
116. Seesupranote9l.

1.17. Henry Swinbume sets out in detail the probable procedure in ecclesiastical
courts. HENRY SWiNBURNE, A BRiEF TREATISE OF TESTAMENTS AND LAST Wnis 224-25
(Garland Reprint ed. 1978) (1590).
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boundary hazily drawn by modem courts.11 Unhappily, the specific
discussion relating the facts of a case to the legal concept of undue
influence does not exist for our testamentary causes; we lack the
opinions of the judges that might explain precisely why a claim of
undue influence was upheld or denied.
What we do know is that it was difficult to sustain a claim of
undue influence or indeed of any other grounds for contesting a will in
the PCC. Less than 10% of all the wills contested during my sample
years were actually denied probate. It may well have been that to
shield themselves against an unmanageable flow of litigation, the
judges created their own healthy presumption of validity in favor of
wills that on their face appear to have been regularly executed.

VIL A PLEA FOR FORMALISM
I have used my historical evidence to ponder points that might
bear consideration before adopting the proposed reform of due
execution statutes. The first was to demonstrate that tightening the
rules on the due execution of one type of will in 1677, the nuncupative
will, did in fact limit litigation thereunder. Second, undue influence
was in the past (and perhaps remains) a rather slippery area of the law.
Arguably, it can sustain no further burdens, and legislatures and judges
should contemplate whether what are presently due execution cases
because of adherence to formalities ought to be litigated under the
rubric of undue influence.
In my introduction, I threatened to offer my own law reform
proposal regarding the due execution of wills to counter that of the
framers of the Uniform Probate Code. As the reader may have
gathered from the tenor of the argument thus far, I shall swim against
the tide, and support even greater formalism in the law of wills than
presently obtains. Thus far in my Article, I have touched two
jurisprudential bases: the historical and the contemporary American.
Let me proceed, albeit briefly, to the comparative to suggest that
American probate practice might consider borrowing from continental
law to limit the problems that have arisen in the areas of due
execution, testamentary capacity, and undue influence.

118. WnijAmM. McGovERN, JR. E AL., Wn.LS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 277-82 (1988)
(indicating the commonness of a claim of undue influence).
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The Statute of Frauds, and even the Statute of Wills, must be
regarded as a limited reform of what was previously a rather anarchic
pattern of will-making in England, particularly when one contrasts
previous English practice with that which obtained on the continent.
Historical studies of probate in continental Europe rarely discuss
contested wills. l 9 The absence of litigation may be attributed to the
notarial system. By requiring written wills to be drafted by notaries,
continental Europeans essentially eliminated the will contest on the
grounds of lack of conformity with requirements of due execution,
undue influence, and another area which has not been addressed
herein, but
looms large in my historical inquiry, testamentary
120
capacity.
Then, as now, in continental Europe, the notary's role
with
respect to testation is to authenticate a will and relieve the courts of the
burden placed on our Anglo-American courts in determining, perhaps
long after the fact, whether the testator was of unsound mind or unduly
influenced or whether the will was the subject of fraud. 121 The notary
makes that judgment at the time the will is executed before her. 22 To
some extent, the notary's role is similar to that served by ante-mortem
probate, an idea that was advocated by123
some American commentators,
disappeared.
have
to
largely
seems
but
To require that all nonholographic wills be executed before a
notary who must be satisfied of the testamentary capacity and freedom
from undue influence or the like as in continental Europe would run
against the tide of law reform in modem America. Indeed, those who
decry formalism may lodge substantial arguments against its
institution. I shall rehearse a few, albeit briefly.
The first argument against such a requirement may well be its
inefficiency. There is the expense of the notary's fee and the cost of
the entire transaction. Arguably, both would be higher in America
119. See, e.g., SAMUEL K. COHN, JR., DEATH AND PROPERTY IN SIENA, 1205-1800
(1988); STEVEN EPSTEIN, WILLS AND WEALTH IN MEDIEVAL GENOA 1150-1250 (1984).

120. C. crv. bk. 3, ch. 5, § 1, arts. 971-979 (Fr.); Bfirgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] bk.
5, arts. 2231-2233, 2247-2249 (F.R.G.); C.c. arts. 603-605 (Italy).
121. MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL,
MATERIALS, AND CASES 261 (1985).

COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS:

TExT,

122. Id
123.

See generally Gregory S. Alexander & Albert M. Pearson, Alternative Models of

Ante-Mortem Probateand ProceduralDue ProcessLimitations on Succession, 78 MICH. L.
REv. 89 (1978) (discussing the recent development of ante-mortem probate).

1996]

DUE EXECUTION OF WILLS

1919

than elsewhere.
Continental notaries support themselves by
performing a variety of lucrative tasks unknown to their American
counterparts, such as the drafting of deeds and contracts.'2 4 Their role
is not merely the authentication of documents. To establish a position
merely to perform the authentication process of wills might be costly
in terms of fees, and to that cost we must add that of registration.
A second quarrel with such a proposal concerns the status of
notaries in America. Unlike in continental Europe, notaries in the
United States, because they really only authenticate signatures, occupy
a rather lowly position. Arguably, it is inappropriate to elevate them to
assume this important, almost quasi-judicial, role. Should the notary
be vested with both crucial and monopolistic powers in the area of
testation?
But perhaps the most serious concern might be the danger to
what might be called "individualism." If one views the thrust of the
reforms embodied in the Uniform Probate Code over time, one must
conclude that the drafters seem very much concerned to protect the
ability of testators to fashion their own estate plans without the need
for lawyers: the "do it yourself' will generated by the testator or a
nonprofessional. To that end, the Code, for example, recognizes
holograph wills,"z unattested form wills where the dispository
provisions have been entered in the hand of the testator,12 6 and partial
revocation by physical act.'2 7 The underlying philosophy of the Code
is that the law should allow the testator to make her will when and
how she wishes even if she does so in the midst
of a letter advising her
28
children of the proper mode of pickling pork.
Assume for argument sake that such latitude is consistent with
American legal culture: We must adopt sections 2-502 and 2-503 to
facilitate testation, even against the advice of a Santayanian. Yet such
a conclusion, however, does not explain why those who do not wish to
shun formality should not have the ability to settle questions of
authenticity, testamentary capacity, and undue influence in advance.
Even if we decide to retain ease of execution and enact the dispensing
124. GLENDON ET AL, supra note 121, at 151-52; see Alexander & Pearson, supra
note 123, at 121-22 (noting the weak probate process in the United States).
125. *U.P.C. § 2-502 (1993).
126. Id. § 2-503 (1993).
127. Id. §§ 2-503, -507 (1993).
128. See In re Kimmel's Estate, 123 A. 405, 405 (Pa. 1924), cited in Langbein, supra
note 2, at 495.
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power or accept the notion of substantial compliance, should we not
also adopt a means by which the perfectly executed will can be
immunized from the challenge of disgruntled heirs on the ground of
undue influence? Is not optional use of the notarial system a sensible
compromise?
VIII. CONCLUSION
To conclude, it may not be difficult to understand the logic of the
argument in favor of the dispensing power or the application of
substantial compliance to the law of wills, and to be persuaded by the
powerful arguments against formalism in the will execution. After all,
it is the decedent's money and not the court's. If he wishes to dispose
of it in his recipes, so be it. Ours is an individualistic and an eccentric
society; the law of wills ought to reflect the tolerance of our culture.
Yet this Article has suggested that the legislature or the judges
ought to recognize the potential for an increasing quantity of probate
litigation raising the issue of undue influence that may follow in the
wake of the adoption of the dispensing power. Likewise, we must
remember that the law governing undue influence has in the past been
less than straightforward, and perhaps no less haphazardly applied than
are remedies for want of due execution. Conceding for the sake of
argument that the balance should tilt in the direction of informality
even at the risk of increased litigation, ought the law not consider a
means by which the more risk averse property owners can protect
themselves against possible claims of undue influence?

